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Abstract
Low-powered contracts do not provide proper incentives to reduce cost; still empirical
studies show that they are quite pervasive in public and private procurement. This paper
argues that low-powered contracts arise due to a free-riding problem when the contrac-
tor enjoys economies of scale/scope working for different buyers. A buyer, offering a
procurement contract to the contractor, does not fully internalize that higher-powered
incentives provide cost reduction in the contractor’s activities, benefiting other buy-
ers. As a result, buyers offer lower-powered contracts than what would be designed by
cooperative buyers. Strikingly, the higher the contractor’s benefits from economies of
scope/scale are, the lower the power of the procurement contracts will be. In addition,
laws which force buyers to award fixed-price contracts can be welfare-enhancing.
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1 Introduction
Public and private transactions are governed by procurement contracts. They represent a large
fraction of total economic activity, and are used to purchase goods and services. The value
of public procurement transactions in EU countries is about 16 percent of their GDP, while
in the United States it is around 20 percent. In the private sector, the value of transactions
is even larger and is steadily increasing, due to the current trend towards outsourcing all
non-core business activities.1
A typical procurement contract specifies a reimbursement fraction a ∈ [0, 1] of the contrac-
tor’s monetary expenditures C and a fixed fee b, which are paid by the buyer to the contractor.
They jointly characterize the buyer’s net transfer T to the contractor, which usually takes a
linear2 form T = b+ aC.
According to the fraction of costs borne by the buyer a, the contracts are classified in:
cost-plus contracts, a = 1; fixed-price contracts, a = 0 ; and incentive contracts, a ∈ (0, 1).
In cost-plus contracts, the contractor does not have incentives to reduce cost since all costs
are borne by the buyer. By contrast, in the fixed-price and incentive contracts, the contractor
is, respectively, the total and partial residual claimant for its cost saving, having incentives
to engage in cost reduction activities. Due to their extremely low-powered incentive scheme,
McAfee and McMillan (1986) argue that cost-plus contracts are never optimal.
Despite the fact that low-powered contracts (i.e., cost-plus) do not provide proper incen-
tives to reduce cost, empirical studies show that they are quite pervasive in public and private
procurement. For instance, Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) document that 43 percent
of the contracts within private firms in the US building construction industry are cost-plus.
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) show that 24 percent of the contracts in the French communities
public transportation industry are cost-plus. Based on this evidence, a natural question arises:
Why are low-powered procurement contracts commonly used in these industries?
1See Dimitri, Piga and Spagnolo (2006), and Bajari and Tadelis (2006) for more details about the relevance
of public and private procurement.
2Real-world contracts are often linear, but some have nonlinear features such as a ceiling on transfers from
the buyer or a guarantee that the contractor will not lose money. Laffont and Tirole (1993) describe in details
other complex procurement contracts, and Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) provide a survey on such complex
contracts.
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The paper shows that low-powered contracts arise in equilibrium due to a free-riding prob-
lem in procurement design when a contractor (agent) has economies of scale/scope working
for several buyers (principals), thereby enjoying positive externalities when providing goods
or services (activities) for different buyers.
In a nutshell, low-powered contracts emerge in equilibrium because a buyer, when designing
a procurement contract to an activity provider, does not fully internalize that eliciting higher-
powered incentives induces cost reduction in the contractor’s activities, which benefits other
buyers. However, he internalizes all costs associated to such incentive scheme. Because buyer’s
private benefit of higher-powered contracts is lower than the public one, buyers offer lower-
powered contracts that would be offered by cooperative buyers.
To understand the main ideas of this paper, consider an industry with several risk neutral
buyers (principals) who all individually demand an activity from a single risk averse contractor
(agent). The contractor faces risks and incurs production costs when performing activities.
However, he can reduce costs by making effort, which is not observed by the buyers (moral
hazard). The contractor also benefits from economies of scale/scope (i.e., positive externality)
when performing activities for different buyers, which is represented by a spillover from the
technology: a contractor, when making an effort to reduce cost in a certain activity for one
of the buyers, also enjoys cost reduction in activities for other buyers.3
Each buyer designs a procurement contract that minimizes his own expenditures when
contracting out an activity. As such, he faces a trade off between risk-sharing and incentives
to reduce cost. On the one hand, when offering a high-powered incentive scheme, a buyer
makes the contractor more residual claimant, thereby increasing the contractor’s exposure to
risk.4 On the other hand, a high-powered incentive scheme induces the contractor to exert
high effort, thereby reducing activity’s costs. By solving this trade-off, buyers choose the
power of the procurement contracts.
3The economies of scale/scope analyzed in this paper can be illustrated by the case of a certain company
(i.e., contractor) which has several branches, and each of them engages in new methods to reduce cost and/or
increase productivity. In this context, the economies of scale/scope take place when a new method developed
by one of the branches reaches other parts of the company, through, for instance, spillover. Consequently, the
whole company benefits from methods developed by any of its branches. This paper will give further detailed
examples about the kind of economies of scale/scope is presented in the model.
4Indeed, it leads the risk averse contractor to demand high monetary compensation to perform the activity.
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When the contractor benefits from economies of scale/scope, a free-riding effect is added
to that trade-off. A buyer does not internalize all the benefits of eliciting high effort: high-
powered incentive scheme also induces the contractor to reduce cost in other activities, thereby
reducing other buyer’s expenditures. Due to the public good feature of eliciting effort, in
equilibrium buyers offer excessively low-powered contracts.
Two assumptions of the model are crucial to generate this free-riding effect: the same
contractor performs activities for different buyers, and the contractor’s economies of scale/sope
in performing several activities. So, one may wonder if those two ingredients are present in
the industries where low-powered contracts are pervasive: US building construction industry
and French communities public transportation industry.
Empirical evidence suggests that those ingredients do exist in those industries. For in-
stance, Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) show that 60 percent of contracts in the North-
ern California construction industry are done by the same firm. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002)
show that 29 percent of the French urban transportation market belongs to one firm.5 Based
on these findings, it seems that there is some supporting evidence that the same contractor
performs activities for different buyers in those industries.
Empirical studies testing the existence of economies of scale/scope, or even the existence of
positive externalities within different activities in the building and public urban transportation
industry are quite scarce.6 However, Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2008) provide some evidence on
the existence of such economies of scope/scale in the French transportation industry showing
that contractors have engineer teams in each city which are responsible for research develop-
ment in quality control, maintenance, and efficiency, whose new methods and procedures can
be used by the entire company.
Some examples in those industries may also illustrate the kind of economies of scale/scope
5Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) document that VIA-GTI Company owns 29 % of the French market share,
whereas other big companies like TRANSDEV and CGEA own, respectively, 15 % and 14 %. Market shares
refer to the whole market, including Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles, the biggest cities of France.
6A set of empirical studies documents the existence of those economies and positive externalities in multi-
product firms in other industries. Monteverde and Teece (1982), for instance, show that the existing positive
externalities in the automobile production process, generated by nontransferable know-how and specific skills,
explains the vertical structure of the US automobile industry. Additionally, Kim (1985) presents evidence on
scale economies in multi-product firms in the US water sector. Furthermore, Fraquelli, Piacenza and Vannoni
(2004) document the presence of scope and scale economies in multi-services providers of public utilities (gas,
water and electricity) in Italy.
3
presented in this paper. In the public transportation industry, the spillover of new re-
pairing methods and procedures inside Veolia Transportation Company describes well such
economies.7 For instance, when Veolia’s mechanic team develops a new method for repair-
ing its light rail in Lyon, part of this knowledge is reached by Veolia’s mechanic team in
Nice, where Veolia also provides the same kind of public transportation. Similarly, the Gran-
ite Construction example illustrates those economies in the building construction industry:
when Granite’s design team develops a new procedure on project design for working in San
Francisco, its project team in San Diego will also learn this new procedure.8
This paper provides some empirical implications describing under which circumstances
low-powered contracts should be more frequently used. In particular, it shows that cost-
plus contracts are more likely to be pervasive in industries in which a contractor benefits
from positive externality for running different activities (economies of scale/scope) than in
industries in which this effect is nonexistent. In addition, it predicts that the higher the
number of activities that a contractor performs for different buyers, the more likely cost-plus
contracts are used.
In this paper, excessively low-powered incentive contracts arise as an inefficient allocation
due to a free-riding problem. One may wonder if there is any policy that can be designed in
order to improve the social allocation. The paper shows that when the number of activities
performed by the same contractor for different buyers is sufficiently high, it is optimal for
buyers to commit to rules that bind them to offer fixed-price contracts rather than choosing
individually their own contracts. This policy recommendation is contrary to Bajari and Tadelis
(2001)’s policy recommendation which suggests that laws forcing the US public entities to
award fixed-price contracts by competitive bidding should be withdrawn from FAR (Federal
Acquisition Rules).
 Related Literature. A set of papers in the literature has analyzed the widespread use
of cost-plus contracts in the US building construction and in the French urban transporta-
7Veolia Transportation is a leader in the transportation industry, and the largest private provider of multiple
modes of transportation in the world.
8The Granite Construction Company is the leader of the 2005 and 2006 California Construction annual
ranking of the largest general contractors in California.
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tion industry.9 Bajari and Tadelis (2001), for instance, argue that cost-plus contracts are
more flexible and easier to renegotiate than the fixed-price under unanticipated contingen-
cies.10 Hence, cost-plus contracts are more likely to be prevalent in industries characterized
by complex activities and frequently subject to incompleteness of contracts, like in building
construction.11 Bajari and Tadelis argue that low-powered contracts (i.e., cost-plus) are more
often used than other contracts because they provide better allocation. In contrast, this paper
argues that low-powered contracts emerge in equilibrium as an inefficient allocation due to a
free-riding problem.
Laffont and Tirole (1986) formulate a principal-agent model of cost-based procurement
and regulation and demonstrate that the principal can implement the optimal mechanism
by offering a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts.12 In particular, they show
that cost-plus contracts are optimally designed for the less efficient contractors, whereas fixed-
price are for the most efficient ones. Nevertheless, Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002, 2008) provide
evidence that such revelation mechanisms do not explain the widespread use of cost-plus
contract in the French urban transportation industry. They show that the political aspects
(i.e., the political side - left or right wing - and the weight given by politicians to costs -
workers - and profits - shareholders) explain the pervasiveness of low-powered contracts in
that industry.
This paper builds on Weitzman (1980) and McAfee and McMillan (1986) which primarily
characterize the optimal procurement contract under moral hazard for a risk neutral buyer
(principal) and a risk averse contractor (agent). Instead, in a multiprinicipals one agent
setting this paper solves the trade off between inducing cost reduction and compensating the
contractor for bearing risk.
Furthermore, this paper is also related to the literature on multi-contracting under moral
9Analyzing the US Air Force engine procurement contracts, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) find that cost-
plus contracts are frequently used at the initial production stages of projects. They argue that in these initial
stages unanticipated changes in projects are expected, therefore flexible contracts (i.e., cost-plus) are desired.
10Bajari and Tadelis (2001) illustrate the incompleteness of contracts in the building construction industry
describing many anticipated contingencies in the site conditions occurred during the building of the Getty
Center Art Museum in Los Angeles. Those events implied in several changes in the original project design.
11Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) find evidence for that showing that cost-plus contracts are more often
used in complex task, which are more likely to be suffer anticipated contingencies.
12Laffont and Tirole wrote a series of papers which expand upon the insights of their basic model and the
results are reported in Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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hazard, started by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and extended by Dixit (1996).13 In Bern-
heim and Whinston, the agent takes one action (one dimension choice variable) which affects
the payoff of all principals. Instead, in our paper the agent takes several actions, one action
for each principal (multidimensional choice variable), and each action affects the other buyers’
payoff through the positive externality in the technology. This difference allows this paper to
provide empirical implications and policy recommendations which have not been addressed in
the procurement literature.
In Dixit (1996), principals write contracts on all agent’s outcome and the externality in
contracting present in his model arises due to the public good nature of eliciting effort. In
this paper, differently, principals contract only on part of agent’s outcome.14
This paper also contributes to the literature on economies of scale/scope and the power of
procurement contracts.15 This link was primarily made by Rogerson (1992), who analyzes the
contractor’s behavior when he performs several activities that share common production costs
- a reason pointed out by Teece (1990) for existence of economies of scale/scope. Rogerson
shows that contractors optimally switch common costs to least powered contracts in order to
get reimbursed for most of the production costs. Naturally, buyers anticipate this contractor’s
behavior, and design excessively high-powered contracts. Due to the difference in the nature
of economies of scale/scope, Rogerson’s model and this paper have different predictions about
the relationship between power of contracts and the existence of such economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the optimal cooperative contract, our benchmark case, which maximizes the net
surplus of all buyers, taking into account all existing externalities associated to the contracting
out problem. Section 4 characterizes the noncooperative contracting equilibrium which arises
when buyers individually design their procurement contracts. Section 5 discuss the results
13Le Breton and Salanie´ (2003) apply the common agency framework to analyze a lobbying game in which
special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and the type of the politician is not common
knowledge.
14Another difference is that Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and Dixit (1996) solve an intrinsic common
agency problem, when the agent must accept or reject all contracts. Instead, this paper deals with a delegated
common agency problem, when the agent can accept or reject any subset of contracts which are offered. Yet in
the adverse selection multi-contracting setting, Martimort and Stole (2009) analyzes the market participation
under delegated and intrinsic common agency games.
15This literature was originally developed by Willig (1979), Teece (1980), and Panzar and Willig (1981),
and related to market structure and multiproduct industries by Bailey and Friedlaender (1982).
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and formally presents the empirical implications of the paper. Section 6 provides a set of
policy recommendations to improve the social welfare, and Section 7 analyzes the effect of
competition among contractors on the power of equilibrium contracts. Section 8 concludes.
Proofs of the propositions that are not in the text can be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
The model is an extension of the standard bilateral principal-agent problem with moral hazard
to the case of many principals, where the principals are risk-neutral buyers and the agent is
a risk-averse contractor.
Building the model on that framework, we consider an industry consisting of n ≥ 2 buyers
and a single contractor. Each buyer wants to procure a different and indivisible activity,16
and the contractor is the only firm which owns the technology to perform those activities.
The contractor may exert an unobservable effort (i.e., investment) in each activity to reduce
production cost. Efforts have spillovers: the effort exerted in certain activity reduces also
production cost of other activities. This effort spillover creates positive externality within
activities.
2.1 Technology
 Production Cost. The contractor incurs a production cost Ci to perform the activity for
buyer-i. It is described by:
Ci(e1, ..., en, κ, εi) = β − ei − κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
ej + εi, for i = 1, ..., n. (1)
Equation (1) states that the contractor incurs a fixed cost β > 0 to perform activity-i but
he can reduce it by making an effort ei in activity-i. Furthermore, the contractor also enjoys
some cost reduction in activity-i by making effort ej in other activities j 6= i. Besides that,
there is an unpredictable cost εi which realizes when the contractor performs the activity. For
16The presence of a multi-unit demand keeps the results unchanged, whereas it introduces a pricing decision
problem, which is out of scope of this paper.
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simplicity, we assume that εi’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according
to a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2, N(0, σ2). In addition, we assume
that Ci is contractible and verifiable.
Clearly, the technology allows the contractor to benefit from positive externality when
performing activities for different buyers: making an effort to reduce cost in a certain activity
for one of the buyers, the contractor also reduces cost in other activities for the other buyers.
This positive externality is captured by the parameter κ, which measures the sum of marginal
impact of increasing effort in all other activities to reduce cost in the activity-i.17 Let us
assume that κ ≥ 0, which means that the externality within activities is positive. When
κ = 0, we have the standard procurement problem already analyzed by Weitzman (1980),
and McAfee and McMillan (1986). In the case where κ > 0, we have the contribution of this
paper.
As it turns out, the positive externality in the production process can also be interpreted
as economies of scale (when the contractor performs the same activity for different buyers)
or economies of scope (when the contractor performs different activities for different buyers),
since the contractor can reduce the production cost per activity performing more than one
activity.
The Veolia Transportation and Granite Construction Company examples, which were pre-
viously discussed, fit to the kind of positive externality (or economies of scale/scope) in this
paper. Other examples like investment in training, know-how and ideas, which the knowledge
can spill over the entire company, also illustrate this externality story.
 Effort Cost. As discussed above, effort clearly has a social value of reducing production
cost. However, it is costly. The contractor bears a cost for making them. For simplicity, we
17The totaly externality in activity-i is divided by n−1 in order to bound the externality effect of increasing
n in the the production cost defined in (1). This assumption is not crucial for the result. It can be replaced
by a less restrictive one which says that the positive externality is not strictly increasing in the number of
activities n. For instance, the results hold if it is assumed that the production cost of the activity-i takes the
following form
Ci(e1, ..., en, κ, εi) =
{
β − ei − κ
∑n
j=1,j 6=i ej + εi , if n ≤ h
+∞ , otherwise with h > 1.
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assume that the cost of effort ei has a quadratic form and is represented by
ψ(ei) =
1
2α
e2i . (2)
The total contractor’s effort cost for making effort in all activities is the sum of (2) over all n
performing activities.18 In expression (2), α measures the cost sensitivity to changes in effort.
Note that, the higher α, the lower the marginal cost of exerting effort. In addition, let us
assume that α > 0, which implies that effort cost is positive.
Let us assume that effort is not observable. Hence, the only contractible variable is con-
tractor’s production cost.
2.2 Buyers and The Contractor
 Buyers. All n buyers are risk neutral and each derives utility v > β per activity per-
formed.19 Each buyer is indexed by i which belongs to the set of buyers N = {1, 2, ..., n}.
Because effort is not contractible, they individually contract on the activity cost, defined in
(1), offering the contractor a standard linear procurement contract.
The standard procurement contract offered by buyer-i to the contractor specifies a reim-
bursement fraction ai of the contractor’s monetary expenditures Ci in activity-i and a fixed
fee bi. They jointly characterize the buyer-i’s net transfer Ti to the contractor, which takes
the form
Ti(Ci) = bi + aiCi, with ai ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
In this linear setting, contracts are fully characterized by the (bi, ai). Buyers, being risk
neutral, are assumed to design contracts to maximize their own expected payoff, which is the
utility derived from the activity minus the expected payment to the contractors, v−E(Ti(Ci)):
V (bi, ai, Ci) = v − bi − aiE(Ci). (4)
18It is assumed that there is no substitutability or complementarity between efforts in the total effort cost
function. Clearly, it is quite natural that efforts are complementary within similar activities performed by the
same contractor: making an investment (effort) to reduce cost in activity-i, may reduce the cost of doing a
similar investment (effort) in an activity-j. If such complementarity is assumed, the results of this paper are
even stronger. Hence, for simplicity, it was assumed the effort cost function described in (2).
19This assumption guarantees that it is optimal for all buyers to procure for an activity.
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 The Contractor. The contractor is a risk averse firm with constant absolute risk aversion,
whose preferences are represented by an CARA utility function described by
u(x) = −exp{−rx}, (5)
where x is the total monetary transfer that contractor receives from buyers minus the pro-
duction and effort costs for performing activities, and r ≥ 0 is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. The contractor is assumed to be risk averse because he faces shocks when
undertaking activities.20
In order to describe the total expected contractor’s payoff-utility when he performs activ-
ities for several buyers, let us first characterize the payoff-utility in a given activity-i. Then
we sum over all activities to obtain his total payoff-utility.
On the one hand, the contractor earns a monetary transfer Ti = bi + aiCi from buyer-i for
performing the activity-i. On the other hand, the contractor incurs production cost Ci, defined
in (1), and an effort cost for exerting effort in the activity-i, defined in (2). Accordingly, the
expected contractor’s payoff for performing activity-i is:
E
[
u
(
bi − (1− ai)Ci − e
2
i
2α
)]
. (6)
Since the contractor has CARA utility function, his expected payoff in equation (6) can
be written as follows:
E
[− exp{− r[bi − (1− ai)Ci − e2i
2α
]}]
. (7)
From expression (1), note that Ci is composed by a sum of deterministic variables, (e1, ..., en,
κ), and a shock εi, which is a random variable normally distributed with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2. In order to compute the expected value of exp (εi), we rely on the property of the
normal distributions that: when a random variable εi is normally distributed with zero mean
and variance σ2, then E[exp (εi)] is equal to exp(
σ2
2
). Accordingly, the expected contractor’s
20The existence of risk averse contractors has been documented by Kawasaki and McMillian (1987), Asanuma
and Kikutani (1992) and Yun (1999) when analyzing the relationship between manufacturers and contractors
in Japan and Korea. Experimental works (see Kagel (1995) for a survey) and econometric studies (Athey and
Levin (2001)) identify risk averse firms analyzing their behaviors in auctions. Salanie´ (1990) and Laffont and
Rochet (1998) analyze the issue of risk aversion in a principal agent model with adverse selection.
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payoff for performing activity-i is:
EU(bi, ai) =
[− exp{− r[bi − (1− ai)E[Ci]− e2i
2α
− r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
]}]
. (8)
In equation (8), note that, the lower the reimbursement fraction of the contractor’s cost
in activity-i ai, the more the contractor residual claimant for its cost saving. Since ai lies in
the interval between 0 and 1, then (1− ai) measures the power of the procurement contract.
In the case that the contractor performs a subset I of the N existing activities, he will
receive monetary transfers for performing those I activities, but he will also incur production
and effort costs. Hence, his expected payoff will be:
E
[
u
(∑
i∈I
bi − (1− ai)Ci − e
2
i
2α
)]
. (9)
Applying to expression (9) the same algebraic manipulations employed in (6) and (7), we
obtain the total contractor’s expected payoff for performing the I activities:
EU({(bi, ai)}i∈I) =
[
− exp
{
− r
∑
i∈I
[
bi − (1− ai)E[Ci]− e
2
i
2α
− r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
]}]
, (10)
where {(bi, ai)}i∈I are, respectively, the fixed fees and reimbursement fractions of the I activ-
ities.
 The Procurement Contracts. The model described above involves two seemingly ad
hoc assumptions, which coincides with the assumption in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)
multitask paper. The more obvious one is that the contract that parties sign specifies a trans-
fer which is a linear function of production cost. The second assumption is more conventional
and therefore less likely to be noticed, but is no less troubling. It is the assumption that the
contractor is required to make a single, once-and-for-all choice of how he will allocate this
efforts during the relationship without regard to the arrival of performance information over
time. A remarkable fact, which was established by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), is that
these two simplifying assumptions are exactly offsetting in this model where the contractor
has CARA preferences and the shocks are normally distributed. That is, the optimal linear
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contract analyzed in this model coincides with the optimal contract in a principal-agent prob-
lem in which the agent (contractor): (i) chooses efforts continuously over time, and (ii) can
observe his accumulated production cost before acting.
In view of its underlying assumptions, the model seems especially well suited for ana-
lyzing contracts between buyers and contractors represented by cost-reimbursement schemes
paid over a short period, like a month, a quarter, or perhaps a year, in industries in which
production costs are cumulative result of persistent efforts over time.
2.3 Sequence of Decisions and Events
Figure 1 describes the timing of the game. The game begins at date 0, when each buyer
individually makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a procurement contract to the contractor.21
Since the contracts are restricted to be linear, as described in (3), each buyer’s offer can be
represented by the fixed fee bi and the reimbursement fraction ai. With abuse of notation,
let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of all contracts, and P(N) be the set of all subsets of the N ,
where I is a typical element of P(N).
At date 1, the contractor accepts or refuses any individual offer, having the right to accept
all contracts in N , or any subset of contracts I ∈ P(N). At date 2, the contractor chooses an
effort ei to make in each activity-i, which belongs to I, in order to maximize his total expected
utility-profit.
When the contractor accepts I contracts, he chooses efforts {ei}i∈I which maximizes this
expected payoff. In this case, his expected payoff is characterized by (10). Hence, the optimal
efforts are the ones that solve the following problem:
max
{ei}i∈I
−exp
{
− r
∑
i∈I
[
bi − (1− ai)E[Ci]− e
2
i
2α
− r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
]}
(11)
where {(bi, ai)}i∈I are, respectively, the fixed fees and reimbursement fractions of the I con-
tracts accepted by the contractor.
21The main results of this paper hold under less extreme assumption on how the buyers and the contractor
reach an agreement over the terms of the contracts. However, it is important that all bargaining power is not
fully allocated to the contractor.
12
The optimal effort in the activity-i is characterized by
ei
α
= (1− ai) + κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj), for all i, j ∈ I, (IC)
which satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions of program (11).
According to equation above, the contractor optimally chooses the effort in activity-i which
equalizes its marginal cost to its marginal benefit. The marginal cost of increasing ei is equal
to ei
α
, which is computed by deriving the effort cost in (2) with respect to ei. The marginal
benefit is the effect of increasing ei on the total nonreimbursed production cost. This marginal
effect corresponds to the sum of the marginal effect of ei on nonreimbursed cost of activity-i,
which is (1− ai), and its marginal effect on nonreimbursed cost of the other activities, which
is κ
n−1
∑
j 6=i(1 − aj). Note that the higher the power of the contracts (1 − ai) is, the higher
the efforts ei’s will be.
As it turns out, equation (IC) corresponds to the incentive compatibility constraint in the
multiprincipals one agent framework. It says that the contractor (agent) optimally chooses
efforts given the incentive schemes {ai}i∈I provided by the buyers (principals). Note that, if
no incentives are provided (ai = 1 for all i, j ∈ I), then all efforts are equal to zero. This
is quite natural: if all costs are borne by the buyers (i.e., contracts are cost-plus), then the
contractor does not have incentives to reduce cost.
In addition, equation (IC) describes how the incentive schemes provided by different buyers
are connected in this model. In particular, it shows that when buyer-i sets high-powered
incentive scheme (low ai) to induce high effort and reduce production cost in his activity-i,
he is also eliciting high effort in all other j activities, thereby reducing production cost of the
activities for all other j buyers. This link between incentive schemes through the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) is the source of free-riding problem analyzed in this model: A
buyer, when designing his contract, does not internalize that when inducing high effort in his
activity, he is also providing incentives to reduce cost in activities for other buyers.
Finally, after making the effort choice, shocks εi realize in each activity at date 3. At date
4, contracts are executed, and payoffs are realized.
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Figure 1: Timing of events
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3 Optimal Cooperative Contract: The Benchmark
The analysis of a free-riding problem requires a benchmark, which is useful for making al-
location and welfare comparisons. The benchmark in this paper is the optimal cooperative
contract. It is defined as the contract that maximizes the total surplus of all buyers, taking
into account all externalities associated to this procurement problem. Indeed, this is the most
appropriate benchmark since the free-riding problem analyzed in this paper arises because
buyers do not completely internalize all the benefits of eliciting effort from the contractor.
Additionally, the cooperative contracting problem addressed in this section is useful to
analyze situations in which a consortia of buyers offers a contract to a firm who has to perform
activities for all associated members, and also the contracting out problem of a national or
state government who has to contract a firm to provide public services/goods in several local
communities.22
In the cooperative contracting problem, buyers cooperatively choose I activities that they
find profitable to contract for, and the terms of the contracts of those activities {(bi, ai)}i∈I .
The optimal contract is the one that maximizes the sum of all buyers net expected payoff. It
is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 The optimal cooperative contract is defined by (Ic, {(bci , aci)}i∈Ic) which solves
22The aim of this section is to characterize the optimal contract when the buyers cooperative contract out
some activities. It does not state when buyers should organize themselves in consortia, or when the public
good/services decision should be centralized. For that, it will be necessary to have a theory which describes
the costs and benefits of coordinating (centralizing) buyers (local public services/goods), which is not the
objective of this paper.
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following problem:
max
I∈P(N),{(bi,ai)}i∈I
E
[∑
i∈I
(v − bi − aiCi)
]
s.t.
ai ∈ [0, 1]
ei
α
= (1− ai) + κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj) i, j ∈ I (IC)
max
{ei}i∈I
E
[
u
(∑
i∈I
bi − (1− ai)Ci − e
2
i
2α
)]
≥ U(0) (IR)
where Ic are the activities the buyers find profitable to contract for, and {(bci , aci)}i∈Ic are,
respectively, the fixed fees and reimbursement fractions of those Ic activities.
The objective function in the problem above is composed by the sum of all buyers utility
for the I activities, minus their total transfer to the contractor. The first constraint of the
problem says that buyers choose the reimbursement fraction of the procurement contracts in an
interval which goes from zero to one. When a = 1, the optimal contract is cost-plus, whereas
when a = 0, it is a fixed-price contract. It is an incentive contracts, if a ∈ (0, 1). Expression
(IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint, and says that buyers take into account that the
contractor optimally chooses the effort in each activity. The last constraint, defined as (IR),
is the participation constraint and says that the contractor must be better off accepting the
I contracts than rejecting all of them. In the case that the contractor rejects all I contracts,
he does not incur any cost, however he receives no monetary transfers. Note that there is
an underlining assumption associated to expression (IR): buyers make an all-or-nothing offer
to the contractor. It means that the contractor should accept to perform all I activities,
otherwise no contract will be offered to him.
Solving the cooperative contracting problem, buyers face a trade off between earning ben-
efits from inducing cost reduction and bearing the costs to compensate the contractor to
bear some risk. Accordingly, if buyers want to induce cost reduction in activity-i, they must
make the contractor more residual claimant, thereby lowering their ai. However, this would
increase contractor’s exposure to risk, inducing him to demand a higher fixed fee bi to per-
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form the activity. By solving this trade-off, they optimally choose the fixed fees bi’s and the
reimbursement fractions ai’s of the optimal contract.
The optimal contract (Ic, {(bci , aci)}i∈Ic) which solves the cooperative contracting problem
is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal cooperative contract (Ic, {(bci , aci)}i∈Ic) is characterized by:
Ic = N (12)
aci =

1− α(1+κ)2
αn[ 2κ
n−1+
κ2(n−2)
(n−1)2 ]+[α(1−
κ
n−1 )
2+rσ2]
∈ (0, 1) , if rσ2 ≥ κ(n− 2)
0 , otherwise
(13)
and
n∑
i=1
bci = n
[
(1− aci)β −
(α(1 + κ)2 − rσ2)(1− aci)2
2
]
(14)
for all i ∈ I, where bci and aci are, respectively, the fixed fee and the reimbursement fraction
of the optimal contract for activity-i.
Proposition 1 shows that buyers will optimally ask the contractor to perform all activities,
Ic = N . This result comes directly from the assumption that v − β > 0, described in Section
2.2, which assumes symmetry between activities. In addition, it assumes that the net expected
utility of each activity is always positive, even though the contractor does not exert any effort
to reduce cost. Indeed, if all activities are symmetric and, independently of the efforts, all
activities individually give positive net utility surplus for the buyers, then they will optimally
demand all of them.
Additionally, Proposition 1 demonstrates that if the risk aversion and shock’s variance are
sufficiently high such that their product, rσ2, is higher than a certain threshold κ(n − 2),
then buyers optimally choose an incentive contract, whose reimbursement fraction aci of the
contracts is between 0 and 1. Otherwise, they choose fixed-price contracts, aci = 0.
The optimal contract has a single solution for the the sum of all fixed fees, which is
characterized in expression (14). However, due to the symmetry between activities, the fixed
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fees {bci}i∈Ic of the optimal contract are not uniquely determined. In particular, many different
combinations of bi’s that satisfy expression (14) are solutions for the cooperative contracting
problem described in Definition 1.
According to Proposition 1, the power of the optimal contract (1−aci), implicitly described
by (13), depends on the externality effect κ. The following corollary analyzes the relationship
between those variables.
Corollary 1 The optimal cooperative contract has the following properties:
• The power of the optimal contract (1− aci(κ)) is monotonically increasing in the exter-
nality effect, κ :
∂(1− aci(κ))
∂κ
≥ 0 (15)
• In the presence of the externality effect, κ > 0, the power of the optimal contract (1 −
aci(κ)) is higher than the power of the optimal contract (1− aci(0)) when the externality
effect is nonexistent, κ = 0:
(1− aci(κ)) > (1− aci(0)). (16)
Corollary 1 shows that the higher the externality effect (measured by the parameter κ),
the higher the power of procurement contracts. The economic intuition for these results is
straightforward: The higher the positive externality within activities, the higher the effort’s
impact in reducing overall contractor’s cost. Hence, the lower the buyer’s transfer to compen-
sate the contractor for the activity’s cost. Since high-powered contracts induce higher effort,
they will be the most profitable incentive schemes for buyers.
In addition to that, Corollary 1 demonstrates that the optimal cooperative contract with
externality, κ > 0, provides higher-powered incentive schemes than the optimal contract
without externality, κ = 0.
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4 Noncooperative Contracting Equilibrium
The focus of this section is to analyze the free-riding problem in procurement design. This
externality in contracting emerges in our model because buyers do not completely internalize
all the benefits of eliciting effort from the contractor.23
To analyze the strategic interaction between procurement designers (buyers), we look at
the Nash equilibrium in contract design. In this context, each buyer individually designs a
procurement contract that maximizes his expected payoff, taking the other buyers’ contracts
as given. This equilibrium concept is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2 The contract profile (Inc, {(bnci , anci )}i∈Inc) is a noncooperative contracting
equilibrium if and only if
(i) For any given contract, (I, {(bi, ai)}i∈I), the contractor
◦ optimally chooses efforts in the I activities:
ei = α
[
(1− ai) + κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj)
]
i, j ∈ I (IC)
◦ is better off accepting the I contracts than any other J subsets of contracts:
max
{ei}i∈I
E
[
u
(∑
i∈I
bi−(1−ai)Ci− e
2
i
2α
)]
≥ max
{ei}j∈J,∀J∈P(N)
E
[
u
(∑
j∈J
bj−(1−aj)Cj−
e2j
2α
)]
(IRnc)
(ii) Given (bnc−i, a
nc
−i), then buyer-i maximizes his expected payoff:
(bnci , a
nc
i ) ∈ arg max
(bi,ai)
E
[
v − bi − aiCi
]
s.t. ai ∈ [0, 1].
This equilibrium definition corresponds to Perfect Nash Equilibrium in contracts. By this
23Yardstick competition, a cost comparison mechanism proposed by Shleifer (1985), may mitigate the free-
riding problem analyzed in this paper. However, as Rogerson (2003) argues, such complex contracts are difficult
and costly to implement. Consequently, buyers and contractors usually prefer to write simple contracts which
have low informational requirements, as the ones characterized in this section.
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definition, (Inc, {(bnci , anci )}i∈Inc) is a noncooperative contracting equilibrium if the contract
(bnci , a
nc
i ) maximizes the buyer-i expected payoff, v− bi− aiCi, taking into account that other
buyers are choosing the contracts (bnc−i, a
nc
−i). In addition, it has to satisfy to two other con-
ditions to be an equilibrium contract. First, constraint (IC) is the incentive compatibility
constraint, which states that the contractor optimally chooses the effort in each activity in
I. Secondly, constraint (IRnc) is the participation constraint of the game. It states that the
contractor must be better off accepting the I contracts than any other J subsets of contracts,
which includes rejecting all contracts. Note that, if contractor rejects all contracts, then he
receives zero monetary transfer and does not incur any cost.
Proposition 2, described below, characterizes a noncooperative contracting equilib-
rium of this model:
Proposition 2 The contract profile (Inc, {(bnci , anci )}i∈Inc) described below is a noncoopera-
tive contracting equilibrium:
Inc = N (17)
anci = 1−
α
(
1 + κ
2
n−1
)
α(1 + κ2) + rσ2
, (18)
bnci = (1− anci )β −
α(1 + κ)2(1− anc)2
2
+
rσ2(1− anc)2
2
, (19)
for all i ∈ I, where bnci and anci are, respectively, the fixed fee and the reimbursement fraction
of the contract for activity-i.
The equilibrium contracts characterized in Proposition 2 have some properties which are
described as follows:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 has the following properties:
• The power of the noncooperative equilibrium contracts (1 − anci (κ)) is lower than the
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power of the optimal cooperative contract (1− aci(κ)),
(1− anci (κ)) ≤ (1− aci(κ)), (20)
holding with equality if and only if there is no externality, i.e. κ = 0;
• the power of the noncooperative equilibrium contracts (1− anci (κ)) is decreasing in n:
∂(1− aci(κ))
∂n
≤ 0 (21)
• It is the unique equilibrium with n-contracts accepted;
• If κ ∈ [0, 1], then it is more profitable than exclusive contracts. Hence, there is no
ex-ante and no ex-post incentive toward exclusive dealing agreements.
The first result in Proposition 3 says that the equilibrium procurement contracts have
lower-powered incentive schemes than the optimal cooperative contracts. This conclusion is
quite intuitive: A buyer, who individually offers a procurement contract for a contractor, does
not fully internalize that eliciting higher-powered incentives provides cost reduction in the
contractor’s activities, which benefits other buyers. Hence, in equilibrium buyers offer lower-
powered procurement contracts than what would be offered if buyers cooperatively designed
their contracts.
To investigate in more details this effect, let us first look at the case in which κ is equal to
zero. Clearly, in this case there is no externality effect in the production cost, and consequently,
there is no free-riding problem. Therefore, the reimbursement fraction of the procurement
contract in the optimal cooperative contracting problem and in noncooperative contracting
equilibrium are the same.
Secondly, let us analyze the case in which κ > 0. It corresponds to the case in which
the externality effect exists and, consequently, the free-riding problem in procurement design
is present. Doing so, let us illustrate it in a simple case where the number of activities-
buyers is equal to two, n = 2. To perform the analysis, we start with a key observation:
in both situations, optimal cooperative contract and noncooperative contracting equilibrium,
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the contractor is indifferent between accepting and rejecting all contracts. This means that
the contractor’s participation constraint is binding in both these cases. Consequently, it
corresponds to say that the total transfer received by the contractor is equal to his total costs,
which are composed by production costs, effort costs and contractor’s desutility for bearing
risk:
T1 + T2 = E[C1(e1(a1, a2), e2(a1, a2), κ, ε1)] + E[C2(e2(a1, a2), e1(a1, a2), κ, ε2)]
+
1
2α
(
e21(a1, a2) + e
2
2(a1, a2)
)
+
rσ2
2
[
(1− a1)2 + (1− a2)2
]
First, note that in the expression above, the efforts e1 and e2 are function of the reim-
bursement fraction of the procurement contracts, a1 and a2. They come from the incentive
compatibility constraint described in (IC), which says that the power of contracts affects the
contractor’s effort decision.
Now, let us see the forces which make the optimal cooperative contract different from the
noncooperative contract. In the optimal cooperative contract, buyers jointly choose (bi, ai)i∈I
such that minimize the total transfers, T1 + T2.
In contrast, in the noncooperative contracting equilibrium, each buyer chooses bi and ai
that minimize its own transfer. For instance, buyer-1 minimizes
T1 = E[C1(e1(a1, a2), e2(a1, a2), κ, ε1)] + E[C2(e2(a1, a2), e1(a1, a2), κ, ε2)]
+
1
2α
(
e21(a1, a2) + e
2
2(a1, a2)
)
+
rσ2
2
[
(1− a1)2 + (1− a2)2
]
− T2.
Taking T2, which is equal to b2 + a2E[C2(e2(a1, a2), e1(a1, a2), κ, ε2)], off his problem, buyer-1
does not fully internalize that by eliciting higher effort from the contracting (i.e., lowering a1),
he will reduce the contractor’s production cost.
Proposition 3 also provides other interesting results. It says that the higher the number
of activities n performed by the same contractor, the lower the power of the equilibrium
contract (1 − anci (κ)). In addition, it states that the noncooperative contracting equilibrium
described in Proposition 2 is the unique equilibrium when the N contracts are accepted.
Furthermore, it shows that those equilibrium contracts are more profitable for buyers than
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exclusive contracts if the externality effect is not so big, κ ∈ [0, 1]. An implication is that
buyers and the contractor have no ex-ante or no ex-post bilateral incentives to write exclusive
dealing contracts. Intuitively, this result says that despite the fact that the free-riding effect
leads to low-powered contracts and, consequently, low effort, those negative effects do not
offset the benefits of having positive externality for providing activities for several buyers.24
At this time, it is worth recalling Corollary 1 and comparing the effect of the external-
ity on the power of contracts in the optimal cooperative contracts with the noncooperative
equilibrium contracts. Corollary 1 says that the higher externality effect κ is, the higher the
power of optimal cooperative contracts will be. This result comes from the fact that the
higher the positive externality within activities, the higher the impact of an effort in reducing
overall contractor’s cost. Hence, it is profitable for buyers to increase the power of the optimal
cooperative contracts.
In contrast, in the noncooperative equilibrium these cooperative statics are not straight-
forward. These results follow from the fact that there are two opposite forces determining
the power of the contracts in equilibrium: the positive externality effect and the free-riding
effect. The positive externality effect is the same one discussed in Corollary 1: The higher the
positive externality within activities is, the higher the power of contracts will be.25 However,
the existence of the free-riding problem puts pressure to lower the power of the equilibrium
contracts. Intuitively, the higher the externality effect κ is, the lower the private contractor’s
benefit for eliciting effort from the contractor will be. Hence, the lower the power of the
contracts. In particular, this free-riding effect increases with the number of activities n.
Corollary 2 analyzes the effect of externality, measured by κ, on the power of equilibrium
contracts (1− anci ).
Corollary 2 The power of the noncooperative equilibrium procurement contracts (1 − anci )
24In contrast, Martimort (1996) shows that exclusive dealing can be optimal in a multi-contracting envi-
ronment with adverse selection. In particular, he demonstrates that depending on the extent of the adverse
selection problem and on the complementarily or substitutability of their brands, manufacturers prefer to use
either a common or an exclusive retailer.
25A buyer, who takes as given the other buyers’ contracts, has more incentive to induce the contractor’s
effort when the externality effect κ is high. It happens because: the higher κ, the higher the reduction in
the contractor’s total cost for eliciting more effort is, and the lower is the buyer’s fixed fee transfer to the
contractor will be. Hence, the higher the benefit of high-powered contracts.
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have the following relationship with the positive externality effect (economies of scope/scale),
measured by κ:
• When the number of buyers contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently low,
n ≤ 2 + rσ2
α
, then the higher the contractor’s positive externality for performing different
activities, the higher the power of equilibrium procurement contracts:
∂(1−anci )
∂κ
≥ 0;
• When the number of buyers contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently high,
n > 2 + rσ
2
α
, then the higher the contractor’s positive externality, the lower the power of
equilibrium procurement contracts:
∂(1−anci )
∂κ
< 0.
Corollary 3 and 4 conclude the section providing additional results on the power of pro-
curement contracts in equilibrium.
Corollary 3 When the number of buyers (principals) contracting with the same contractor is
sufficiently high, n ≥ 2 + rσ2, then the noncooperative equilibrium contracts with externality,
κ > 0, have lower-powered incentive schemes than the optimal cooperative contract without
externality, κ = 0,
(1− anci (κ)) ≤ (1− aci(0)).
Corollary 4 If n ≥ 3, then each buyer’s expected transfer in the noncooperative equilibrium
increases with the number of buyers (principals),
∂T nci
∂n
> 0.
Corollary 3 says that, even in the presence of positive externality, the equilibrium con-
tracts have lower incentive power than the optimal contract when the positive externality is
nonexistent. Corollary 4 says that the higher the number of activities performed by the same
contractor for all buyers, the higher the transfers paid by each buyer. Consequently, the lower
the buyer’s expected payoff. It implies that the free-riding effect does damage the buyer’s
payoff, and in particular, that negative impact increases with the number of buyers. In addi-
tion, it shows that negative free-riding effect dominates the benefits of having the contractors
performing several activities (i.e., the positive externality).
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The negative relationship between buyer’s transfer and the number of buyers, described
in Corollary 4, has narrow connections to some results in the public good literature. In
particular, it is related to Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Hellwig (2003)’s result that
when the number of agents who contribute for a public good increases, the provision of public
goods decreases. The common feature between this paper and the public good literature comes
from the fact that eliciting effort in a multi-contracting setting has a public good nature: a
buyer, who gives incentives to the contractor to reduce cost in his own activity, is at the same
time contributing to reduce cost in activities for other contractors.
5 Empirical Implications
The main contribution of this paper is to explain how the existence of a positive externality
creates free-riding problem in procurement design, which leads to excessive low-powered con-
tracts in different industries. A testable model on the power of procurement contract has to
deliver conditions under which low-powered contracts are more likely to be used. Our model
yields potentially testable implications describing circumstances under which low-powered
contracts should be used more frequently.
5.1 Externality in production, and economies of scope/scale: the
likelihood of low-powered contracts
An empirical implication which can be derived from this paper refers to the relationship
between κ and the power of procurement contracts. It can be obtained directly from Corollary
2, and it is formally stated in the following implication:
Implication 1 Consider the industries in which economies of scope and scale in the pro-
duction process are prevalent, κ > 0. When the number of buyers contracting with the same
contractor is sufficiently low, n ≤ 2 + rσ2
α
, the higher contractors’ economies of scope/scale
κ in a given industry, the more likely the use of high-powered procurement contracts. On the
other hand, when the number of buyers contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently
high, n ≥ 2 + rσ2
α
, then this relationship is inverted: the higher the contractors’ economies of
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scope/scale κ, the more likely the use of low-powered procurement contracts.
This implication comes from that fact that two different forces determine the power of
procurement contracts: the externality effect and the free-riding effect. The externality effect
offsets the free-riding effect for low values of n, establishing a negative relationship between
the externality parameter κ and the power of the equilibrium contracts. Conversely, for
high values of n, the free-riding effect dominates, which makes the power of the equilibrium
contracts decrease with κ.
Another implication can be easily derived from Corollary 3. In summary, this corollary
suggests: when the number of buyers contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently high,
then the noncooperative equilibrium contracts in the presence of externality in the production
process (economies of scale/scope) have lowered-powered incentive schemes than the optimal
cooperative contracts when such economies are nonexistent.
In order to derive an empirical implication from this result, let us first note that the
optimal cooperative contract without externality coincides with the noncooperative contract
without externality. It is quite natural since the source of inefficiency in multi-contracting is
the externality. Therefore, the empirical implication is formally expressed as follows:
Implication 2 We consider industries in which the number of buyers contracting with the
same contractor is sufficiently high, n ≥ 2 + rσ2. Then, industries in which economies of
scale/scope in the production process are prevalent (κ > 0) shall have lower-powered procure-
ment contracts than industries in which externalities of this kind are nonexistent (κ = 0).
Other papers in the literature have related economies of scale/scope to the power of pro-
curement contracts. For instance, Rogerson (1992) and (1994) analyze the contractor’s be-
havior when he performs several activities which share common production costs. Rogerson
shows that the contractor optimally swifts common costs to least powered contract in order to
get reimbursed for most of the production costs. Naturally, an implication of Rogerson’s re-
sult is that contract designers will anticipate the contractor’s behavior and design excessively
high-powered contracts in a way to avoid the overhead allocation of costs.
As it turns out, Rogerson (1992) and (1994) provide different empirical implications con-
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cerning the relationship between the power of procurement contracts and the intensity of
economies of scale/scope in certain industries: Rogerson’s models suggest that this relation-
ship should be positive in order to prevent from contractor’s cost overhead behavior. By
contrast, this paper, by Corollary (2), argues that the same relationship should be negative
when the number of buyers contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently high.
Clearly, these opposite empirical implications come from the different nature of the economies
of scale/scope addressed in this paper and Rogerson’s. In Rogerson’s papers, the economies
of scale/scope arises due to the existence of common assets, inputs and workers, which are
used in different activities of the contractors. As such, it suggests that there should be a
positive relationship between the power of procurement contractors and the share of common
cost used by the contractor in his different activities.
In contrast, in this paper the economies of scale/scope emerge due to the existence of
common methods or procedures which are developed by a contractor’s branch (i.e., activity),
and can be used for all other contractor’s activities. Hence, it implies that we should observe
in the data a negative relationship between the power of procurement contractors and the
new methods and procedures developed by the contractors.
5.2 Incomplete Contracts, renegotiation and the number of buyers:
on the pervasiveness of cost-plus contracts
In some industries, only two types of procurement contracts are observed: fixed-price and
cost-plus contracts. That is, for instance, the case of the US building construction industry,
described by Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008), and the French public urban transportation,
highlighted by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002).
The literature has already discussed the reasons why we only observe those extreme con-
tracts. Bajari and Tadelis (2001), relying on Townsend (1979), and Gale and Hellwig (1985),
argue that the existence of measurement costs (i.e., auditing or verification cost) explains
the choice of fixed-price contract (a = 0) to any other cost-sharing contract with a ∈ (0, 1].
Basically, fixed-price contracts do not require the measurement of production costs, whereas
any cost-sharing contract requires such measurement, which is costly. This leads to a non-
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convexity in the cost of measuring and monitoring product costs. An immediate implication
of the existence of auditing cost is that fixed-price contracts will dominate contracts that are
close to them.
On the other hand, the incompleteness of contracts explains the choice of cost-plus contract
(a = 1) to any other procurement contracts with a ∈ [0, 1). As argued by Bajari and Tadelis
(2001), cost-plus contracts are more flexible and easier to renegotiate under noncontratactable
contingencies. Hence, when renegotiation is costly, cost-plus contracts dominate any other
contracts with low-powered incentive scheme where a ∈ [0, 1).
The focus of this section is to derive conditions under which cost-plus contracts arise in
industries plagued by incomplete contracts and costly renegotiations. In order to provide
empirical implications for those industries, let us add some additional assumptions to the
standard model described in section 2.
 Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Assume that there are some states of the
nature in which contracts are incomplete. It occurs with probability µ ∈ (0, 1). It can happen
because some contingencies happen (e.g., site conditions in the building construction industry)
and a buyer decides to change the demand or project after the contract has been signed with
the contractor, and the contractor had optimally chosen the effort. Under incompleteness,
buyer and contractor renegotiate the contract. Following Bajari and Tadelis (2001), let us
assume that cost-plus contract (a = 1) have zero renegotiation cost, whereas the renegotiation
of any other contract26 with a ∈ [0, 1) costs K.
In this extended model, let us derive the conditions in which cost-plus contracts emerge
in equilibrium. A sufficient condition is that each buyer is better off relying on cost-plus than
relying in the equilibrium contracts described in Section 4.27
26The renegotiation process can take different ways, which will depend, among other things, on the bargain
power of buyers and the contractor. In each different renegotiation process, the cost will be different. For
simplicity, we do not model the renegotiation process. That is the reason why we consider the negotiation
cost as an exogenous variable.
27A sufficient and necessary condition for an equilibrium with cost-plus contracts is that each buyer is better
off relying on cost-plus than deviation offering another contracts. If all buyers, except buyer-i, offer a cost-plus
contracts, then the contractor effort will be e∗i = α(1− ai) < enci , and e∗j = κα(1−ai)n−1 < encj . Given these effort
levels, the cost will be C∗i > C
nc
i , and then the net transfer to the contractor when deviating T
∗
i is lower than
the net in equilibrium Tnci described in Section 4. For this reason it is sufficient to compare the buyer’s payoff
under cost-plus contracts with the equilibrium contracts described in Section 4.
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By relying on a cost-plus contractor, a buyer knows he will never pay the renegotiation
cost. However, he will anticipate that the contractor will choose all efforts equal to zero,
having production cost Ci equals to β. Since in equilibrium with only cost-plus contracts
ai = 1, ∀i, the contractor does not bear any risk and makes zero effort, buyer’s transfer to the
contractor will be equal to the production cost of the activity which is β. So, buyer’s expected
payoff for offering cost-plus contracts will be:
v − β. (22)
Instead, if all buyers offer the equilibrium contracts described in Section 4, then, with
probability 1 − µ, they will not have to renegotiate the contracts, and each one will have a
payoff equal to v− T nci . However, with probability µ, they will renegotiate the contracts, and
each one ends up with payoffs equal to v − T nci −K. Therefore, buyer’s expected payoff for
offering the equilibrium contracts described in Section 4 will be:
v − T nci − µK. (23)
Expressions (22) and (23) give us the necessary ingredients to verify when that cost-plus
contracts will be emerge in equilibrium. That will occur when buyer’s payoff for choosing v−β
is greater than v−T nci −µK, buyer’s payoff for choosing the equilibrium contract. After some
simple algebra, we can show that the cost-plus contracts will emerge in equilibrium when the
renegotiation cost is sufficiently high:
K ≥ K,where K = β − T
nc
i
µ
. (24)
The following proposition formally characterizes the condition for cost-plus contracts to
emerge in equilibrium in a model with incomplete contracts and renegotiation.
Proposition 4 If K ≥ K, where K is defined in (24), then cost-plus contracts are equilibrium
contracts in a model with incomplete contracts and renegotiation.
Note that, through expression (24), whenever buyer’s transfer in equilibrium T nci decreases,
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so will the threshold K. This result is quite intuitive since by decreasing T nci , the benefit of
offering the equilibrium contract also reduces.
In order to test the result characterized above, an econometrician will need information
about the renegotiation cost to proceed the analysis. However, in many situations the rene-
gotiation cost is not observable.28 In general, the only information that the econometrician
has is that K is distributed according to a certain density function G(.).
With the information described above, an econometrician derives that the probability of
cost-plus contracts emerging in equilibrium is equal to:
Prob(K ≥ K) = 1−G(K) (25)
Indeed, a testable model on power of procurement contracts must establish what increases
or reduces the probability of observing cost-plus contracts, described in (25). In particular, it
has to characterize what changes K, and the direction of the change. This model does so by
using the result from Corollary 3. Combining the Corollary 3 with the implication discussed
above, we can derive the following implication:
Implication 3 The higher the number of buyers per contractor, n, the more likely it is that
the cost-plus contract will be chosen.
Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) provide some evidence which is consistent with this
implication, showing that the higher the number of contracts carry out by a contractor, the
higher the probability that cost-plus contracts will be offered to this contractor.
Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) offer a different explanation for such empirical finding,
based on Banerjee and Duflo (2000). Banerjee and Duflo argue that in industries in which the
services (or goods) are very complex and the quality of the final product is very different from
one contractor to another, then buyers would not offer contracts based on competitive bidding
for fixed-price contractors. Instead, buyers optimally award an activity to the contractor who
has built a good reputation over time, and they negotiate a cost-plus contract which will lead
28Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) uses the complexity of tasks as an instrument for renegotiation cost
since the more complex the task are, the more likely that contract will be incomplete.
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to a high quality service or good. Relying on this explanation, Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis
argue that the number of jobs done by a contractor is a measure of reputation. Therefore, it
explains the positive relationship between the number of jobs done by a contractor and the
probability that cost-plus contracts will be offered to the contractor.
6 Policy Recommendations
In this paper, excessively low-powered incentive contracts emerge as an inefficient allocation
due to a free-riding problem: buyers offer lower-powered contracts than cooperative buyers.
One may wonder about the possible solutions for this problem. For the public sector, a
natural policy recommendation is the centralization of local and state government purchases.
Centralizing the purchase of services, with positive externalities among themselves, will induce
the procurer to internalize a big portion of the benefit of eliciting effort.
Nevertheless, centralization in public sector is never an easy policy to implement, since it
is usually accompanied by a reduction of local government’s power.29 Alternatively, national
authorities could create mechanisms which induce local governments to buy goods and public
services together. Inducing them to design procurement contract jointly can potentially make
them to internalize possible existing externalities in contracting out for services or goods. An
example of this kind is the Brazilian System of Price Registration, a procurement system
which allows different branches of the national Brazilian government (administrative units,
public institutes, hospitals, universities, and others) to buy jointly different goods. However,
it has been used only to buy simple goods, which are more likely to be optimally purchased
through fixed-price contracts. In the spirit of this paper, this system should be extended to
encompass the purchase of public services, where positive externalities are more likely to be
present.30
As in the public sector, the private sector should also be aware of free-riding in procurement
and try to design mechanisms to overcome it. Agreements and consortia of buyers should
29Hart and Holmstrom (2009) analyze the trade off between autonomy and coordination faced by an orga-
nization which sees some benefits from integrating a set of activities.
30The Brazilian System of Price Registration (Sistema Brasileiro de Registro de Prec¸os) is regulated by the
Law no 8.666 created in 1993 and has been widely used in several branches of the Brazilian government.
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be encouraged, since they may induce buyers to design procurement contracts jointly, and
internalize all existing positive externalities among different activities.31
Nevertheless, solutions of these kind are not always easy to implement and rely strongly
on the capacity of buyers to coordinate themselves. One may wonder if there is any simple
rule that can be designed to improve the social allocation.
Proposition 5 If rσ2 ≤ rσ2, then there exists n such that for all n ≥ n buyers are better off
committing to fixed-price contracts, a = 0, than relying on linear contracts, a ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 5 states that laws in the public sector that bind public entities to offer fixed-
price contracts rather than choosing individually their own contracts can be welfare-enhancing.
Binding public entities to offer fixed-price contracts (a = 0) prevents a buyer from free-riding
behavior, since under the fixed-price contracts buyers internalize all the benefit of eliciting
effort. However, it transfers too much risk for the contractor, who requires a high compensation
for bearing risk of the activity. When the risk and the variance of the shock are not so high,
expressed by the condition rσ2 ≤ rσ2 above, then buyers are better off jointly relying on
fixed-price contracts.
The result in Proposition 5, discussed in the previous paragraph, provides the theoretical
foundations for the following policy recommendation:
Policy Recommendation Laws that force public sector to award fixed-price contracts com-
petitive bidding should be adopted in industries in which:
• there are a lot of buyers and a few contractors;
• risk borne by contractors is low enough.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) argue that cost-plus
contract are more efficient than fixed-price contracts under certain circumstances (i.e., under
incompleteness of contracts and high costs of renegotiation). They advice the laws which
31Of course, regulators should be aware that promoting agreements between buyers in noncompetitive
markets can also give them additional incentive to collude: Buyers, whose activities are more likely to be
affected by externality effects, are also the same ones who compete for the same consumers.
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oblige the US public entities to award fixed-price contracts by competitive bidding should be
withdrawn from FAR (Federal Acquisition Rules).
Note that Bajari and Tadelis (2001), and Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2008) have a
policy recommendation which is contrary to the one in this paper. Naturally, these opposite
guidelines come from differences in accounting for the pervasiveness of low-powered procure-
ment contracts in certain industries. Bajari and Tadelis, and Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis
argue that low-powered contracts (i.e., cost-plus) are more often used than other contracts be-
cause they provide better allocation. In contrast, this paper argues that low-powered contracts
emerge in equilibrium as an inefficient allocation due to a free-riding problem.
7 Competition between Contractors
In the basic model, described in Section 2, there is only one contractor providing services for
all buyers. However, in the real world, many potential contractors compete for provision of
goods and services for different buyers. Hence, it will be interesting to analyze how competition
between contractors impacts the power of incentive schemes in equilibrium.
To introduce competition between contractors, we make a modification in the basic model,
based on McAfee and McMillan (1986). In this extension, potential contractors compete for
activities bidding for the fixed fee bi of the procurement contracts offered by buyers.
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This extended model will be called Procurement Auction Design Game. Here are
the additional assumptions to the basic model and the new timing of the game:
 Potential Contractors. Assume that there is a continuum of potential contractors, each
one is indexed by its fixed cost β. In addition, assume that β is distributed according to a
density function F (β), with ∂F (β)
∂β
= f(β), and f(β) 6= 0 for all β in the interval [β, β]. For
simplicity, assume that the contractor’s fixed cost β is public information.
 Sequence of Events. Figure 2 describes the timing of the Procurement Auction Design
32Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988) suggest a different approach to model competition among contractors.
In particular, they consider the auctioning for incentive contracts of an indivisible project among several
contractors. Contractors have private information about their future cost at the bidding stage, and the
selected firm ex post invests in cost reduction.
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Game. At date 0, each buyer individually chooses and posts the reimbursement fraction
ai ∈ [0, 1] of a contract awarded to the contract winner. At date 1, every contractor bids for
the fixed fee bi of each contract. The contractor who bids for the lowest fixed fee of buyer-
i’contract bi, will perform the activity for the buyer-i. At date 2, buyer-i awards activity-i
to the winner, and, at date 3, the contract winner(s) choose(s) the effort ei to make in each
activity in order to maximize his expected utility profit. After making the effort choice, at
date 4 the shocks in each activity εi realize. Contracts are executed, and payoffs are realized
at date 5.
As it turns out, this extended model is a dynamic game with perfect information, and can
be divided in two sequential stages. The first one is the Procurement Design stage, where
buyers choose ai ∈ [0, 1] and award the activity to the contract winner. It corresponds to date
0 in Figure 2. The second one is the Procurement Auction stage, where contractors compete
and make effort in the activities. It is represented by dates 1 to 5 in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Timing of Procurement Auction Design Game
0 1 2 3 4 5
6
Each buyer offers
the contract, ai,
to be performed
by the winner
6
Contractor bids
for the activities
6
Activity-i is
awarded to the
lowest bid for
the activity-i
6
Winner(s)
choose(s)
effort(s) for
the activity(ies)
Shock ε’s
are realized
6
Contracts are
executed, payoffs
are realized
6
 Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium. For games of this kind, the relevant equilibrium
concept is Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). This equilibrium can be characterized
by the backward induction. Doing so, we first derive the Nash Equilibrium in the Procurement
Auction stage, and then proceed to characterize the Nash equilibrium in the Procurement
Design stage.
Nash Equilibrium in the Procurement Auction stage: In this stage, contractors bid for the
right to perform the activity for each buyer. Since there is no private information, and the
33
only source of asymmetry among contractors is the fixed cost β, the kind of competition
which takes place at this stage of the game is the standard Bertrand competition between a
continuum of asymmetric agents.
As such, contractors fiercely compete for the n activities and, in equilibrium, they make
zero profit. As a result, the sum of all bids of certain contractors β ∈ [β, β] will be equal to
total cost of performing all activities, which is expressed by:
n∑
i=1
bi(β) =
n∑
i=1
[
(1− ai)E[Ci(β)] + e
2
i
2α
+
r(1− ai)2σ2
2
]
(26)
The equilibrium outcome of this competition is that the most efficient contractor, the one
whose β = β, wins all procurement auction, and performs every activity for all buyers. Due
to the presence of the positive externality within activities, many bidding strategies for each
activity leads to the total bidding equilibrium strategy described in (26). To proceed to the
Procurement Design Stage, we have to pick one of them. So, let us take bidding strategy
equilibrium which the bid for the activity-i is equal the contractor’s cost bearing in activity-i:
bi(β) = (1− ai)E[Ci(β)] + e
2
i
2α
+
rσ2(1− ai)2
2
(27)
It is easy to see that the bidding strategy in (27) satisfies to total bidding strategy equi-
librium requirement described in (26).
Nash Equilibrium in the Procurement Design stage: In this stage, each buyer individually
chooses the optimal reimbursement fraction of his procurement contract, ai, taking into ac-
count the bidding strategy equilibrium from the Procurement Auction stage, described in
(27). The buyer’s problem and the equilibrium associated to this strategic interactions among
them is formally defined in the following definition:
Definition 3 The contract profile (Ipa{(bpai , apai )}i∈Ipa) is a procurement auction design
contracting equilibrium if
(bpai , a
pa
i ) solves max
bi,ai
E
[
v − bi − aiCi
]
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s.t.
ai ∈ [0, 1], (IC), and (27)
for given (bpa−i, a
pa
−i), for all i ∈ Ipa.
The buyer’s problem in this procurement design is similar to the buyer’s problem in Defi-
nition (2). The only difference is that in Definition (3) the bidding strategies, represented by
constraint (27), replace the participation constraint (IRnc) in Definition (2).
The next proposition compares the power of the procurement auction equilibrium contracts
with the noncooperative equilibrium contracts discussed in Proposition (2):
Proposition 6 If κ ∈ (0, 1), then the power of the procurement contracts in the procure-
ment auction design game (1− apai ) is lower than the power of the noncooperative equilibrium
contracts (1− anci ),
(1− apai ) < (1− anci ), for all i. (28)
This result says that in the presence of competition of contractors for the fixed fee, the
free-riding effect becomes even stronger. To illustrate this, let us again, for simplicity, take
n = 2. As we have discussed in Section 4, buyer-1 minimizes
T1 = E[C1(e1(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ), e2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ), κ, ε1)] + E[C2(e2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ), e1(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ), κ, ε2)]
+
1
2α
(
e21(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ) + e
2
2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 )
)
+
rσ2
2
[
(1− apa1 )2 + (1− apa2 )2
]
− T2.
where T2 is equal to b2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ) + a
pa
2 E[C2(e2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ), e1(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 , κ), ε2)]. Note that, unlike
the noncooperative contracting problem, the contractor’s bid for the fixed fee of activity-2,
b2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ), depends on the reimbursement fraction of the contractor, and that is the reason
for the free-riding problem to be stronger in the Procurement Auction Design Game.
The explanation for this is quite intuitive: When buyer-1 decreases apa1 , he elicits higher
effort, and provides higher incentives to reduce cost. Conceivably, lower cost will be translated
into a lower bid for activity-1 and 2. As the expression above shows, buyer-1 does not enjoy
any profit from lower bids in activity-2, b2(a
pa
1 , a
pa
2 ). Hence, he elicits less incentive to perform
higher effort that he does in the noncooperative contracting equilibrium.
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As it turns out, the result in Proposition 6 comes from the sequential nature of the Pro-
curement Auction Design Game described in this section. To understand the reason for that,
first note that in the last stage of the game, in the procurement auction stage, contractors
choose their bids taking as given the power of all contracts. In particular, the higher the power
of any contract, the higher the bid of each contractor for each activity, as demonstrated in
equation (27). In the first stage of the game, in the procurement design stage, buyers choose
the power of the contracts. When a certain buyer chooses the power of his contracts, he
internalizes that by increasing the power of his contract, the bid for his activity increases.
However, he doesn’t internalize that by increasing the power of his contract, he will induce
the firms to bid more aggressively for other activities. This new effect, added to the free-riding
effect discussed in section 4, jointly explains why the inefficiency is stronger when contractors
bid for the fixed fee.
Note that, in the equilibrium described in Section 4, the fixed fees correspond to the bids
described in this section. However, unlike this section, in the noncooperative equilibrium
buyers simultaneously choose the fixed fees and the power of the contracts.
8 Conclusions
This paper analyzes free-riding in procurement design, which provides an explanation for
the pervasiveness of low-powered contracts in certain industries, such as the US building
construction and French public bus transportation industry. We argue that buyers do not
provide high enough incentive schemes because they do not completely internalize all the
benefits of eliciting contractor effort.
The model predicts that low-powered contracts are more likely to be pervasive in industries
in which a contractor benefits from positive externality when running different activities than
in industries in which this effect is nonexistent, and in industries in which the number of
activities that a contractor performs for different buyers is sufficiently high. These implications
could be the subject of an interesting empirical test that will shed light on contracts that have
been used in other industries.
Since excessively low-powered incentive schemes emerge as an inefficiency, this paper pro-
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vides some policy recommendation to improve the social allocation. In particular, it recom-
mends that under certain circumstances laws that bind local governments to award fixed-price
contracts by competitive bidding should be used. It may overcome the free-riding problem,
and increase the social welfare. Hence, unlike Bajari and Tadelis (2001), this paper argues
that in some industries cost-plus contract should not be allowed.
A potential interesting extension of this work would be the analysis of this multi-contracting
problem in an adverse selection setting. Martimort and Stole (2009) solve a similar problem
under private, intrinsic and delegated agency. The introduction of economies of scape/scope
presented in this paper to the standard Laffont and Tirole (1986) model, can potentially bring
new insights about how contracts are used in the practice.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1Part 1 : Since that effort in each activity is restricted to positive,
ei ≥ 0,∀i , then expected production cost of each activity defined in (1) has a upper bound
which is β. Therefore, wherever is the contractor’s effort choices, E(Ci) ≤ β. Because v−β >0,
then v − E(Ci) > 0. It means that any activity contributes positively to increases the total
net surplus, even though the contractor exerts zero effort. Hence, the buyers will optimally
demand all activities. That is the reason why is optimality to have Ic = N .
Part 2: Optimal {(bi, ai)}ni=1 Given that Ic = N , the cooperative contracting problem is:
max
{(bi,ai)}ni=1
E
[ n∑
i=1
(v − bi − aiCi)
]
s.t.
ai ∈ [0, 1]
ei = α
[
(1− ai) + κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj)
]
i, j = 1, ...n (IC)
max
{ei}ni=1
E
[
u
( n∑
i=1
bi − (1− ai)Ci − e
2
i
2α
)]
≥ U(0) (IR)
Using expression (10), the (IR) constraint can be replaced by
b+
n∑
i=1
[
− (1− ai)E[Ci]− e
2
i
2α
− r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
]
≥ 0, (IR∗)
where b =
∑n
i=1 bi, and ei and the optimal described in (IC).
Replacing the (IR) in the production cost definition in (1), and the replacing it in (IR∗),
we can rewrite the cooperative contracting problem as follows:
max
{(bi,ai)}ni=1
E
[ n∑
i=1
(v − bi − aiCi)
]
s.t.
ai ∈ [0, 1]
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b+
n∑
i=1
{
− (1− ai)
[
β −
[
α
[
(1− ai) + κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj)
]]
− κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
[
α
[
(1− ai) + κ
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj)
]]
+
[
α
[
(1− ai) + κn−1
∑
j 6=i(1− aj)
]]2
i
2α
− r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
}
≥ 0 (IR∗).
For the maximization problem, in the optimal constraint (IR∗) is binding. After replacing the
bidding (IR∗) constraint in the objective function, we derive the first-order conditions of the
problem.
The first-order conditions are:
(1 + κ2) = (1− ai)
[
1 +
κ2
n− 1 + rσ
2
]
+
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj)
[ 2κ
n− 1 +
(n− 2)κ2
(n− 1)2
]
, ∀i, j = 1, ..., n
The n conditions above are equations of a system of equations. The {ai}ni=1 which are
solutions for this system of equations is the optimal reimbursement fraction of the contractor’s
production cost.
Solving it, we obtain
aci =

1− α(1+κ)2
αn[ 2κ
n−1+
κ2(n−2)
(n−1)2 ]+[α(1−
κ
n−1 )
2+rσ2]
∈ (0, 1) , if rσ2 ≥ κ(n− 2)
0 , otherwise
Replacing the optimal aci ’s in the binding (IR
∗) constraint, we obtain b. Since that b =
∑n
i=1 bi,
then we get
n∑
i=1
bci = n
[
(1− aci)β −
(α(1 + κ)2 − rσ2)(1− aci)2
2
]
.
The first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient because the objective is concave in the
choice variables.
Proof of Corollary 1 Part 1 : From Proposition 1, in equation (13) we have
aci =

1− α(1+κ)2
αn[ 2κ
n−1+
κ2(n−2)
(n−1)2 ]+[α(1−
κ
n−1 )
2+rσ2]
∈ (0, 1) , if κ ≤ rσ2
n−2
0 , otherwise
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For the case which κ ≤ rσ2
n−2 , we have
∂(1− aci(κ))
∂κ
=
2(1 + κ)
[
α(1+κ)2
αn[ 2κ
n−1+
κ2(n−2)
(n−1)2 ]+[α(1−
κ
n−1 )
2+rσ2]
]
+ (2 + 2κ)(1 + κ)2[
α(1+κ)2
αn[ 2κ
n−1+
κ2(n−2)
(n−1)2 ]+[α(1−
κ
n−1 )
2+rσ2]
]
After some algebraic manipulations, we get
∂(1−aci (κ))
∂κ
= 2(1 +κ)rσ2, which is strictly positive.
For the case which κ ≥ rσ2
n−2 , then a
c
i is always equal to zero. Therefore,
∂(1−aci (κ))
∂κ
= 0.
Part 2 : From equation (13), note that when κ = 0, we are in the case that κ ≤ rσ2
n−2 , which
means that (1−aci) ∈ (0, 1). In particular, (1−aci) reaches its lower bound, which is 1− αα+rσ2 ,
when κ = 0 .
When κ > 0, we can have two cases: (i) κ ≤ rσ2
n−2 , and (ii) κ >
rσ2
n−2 . In case (i),
∂(1−aci (κ))
∂κ
>
0, which implies that (1− aci(κ)) > (1− aci(0)). In addition, (1− aci(κ)) ∈ (0, 1). In case (ii),
(1 − aci(κ)) = 1 which is greater than (1 − aci(κ)) when κ ≤ rσ
2
n−2 . Therefore, (1 − aci(κ)) ≥
(1− aci(0)) for all κ. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Part 1 : If buyers offer {(bnci , anci )}ni=1 as defined in (18) and (19),
then the contractor will have payoff equals zero in the case that he accepts all the contract,
and negative payoff if he rejects any of the n contract. To see that, just as (18) and (19) in
expression (10), we obtain that EU({(bi, ai)}i∈I) = U(0), if I = N , and EU({(bi, ai)}i∈I) <
U(0), if I 6= N . Note that, given the equilibrium contracts, the contractor is indifferent
between accept all contracts and rejecting all contracts. In particular, he is worse-off accepting
a subject of the contracts. It happens because if he accepts just a subset, he loses the positive
externality, receiving a negative net payoff.
Part 2 : Each buyer-i chooses (bi, ai) which minimizes his expected transfer, Ti = bi +
aiE[Ci], taking into account the other buyer’s contracts, (b
nc
−i, a
nc
−i), described in (18) and (19),
and (IC) and (IRnc). Replacing (18) and (19), and (IC) in (IRnc), buyer-i chooses (bi, ai) that
make the (IRnc) - buyer-i maximizing his expected payoff will not leave rent for the contractor.
Given that, we obtain that
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bi = −
∑
j 6=i
bncj −
[
−(1−ai)E[Ci]− e
2
i
2α
−r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
]
−
∑
j 6=i
[
−(1−ancj )E[Cj]−
e2j
2α
−r(1− a
nc
j )
2σ2
2
]
(29)
where ei = ei(ai, a
nc
−i),∀i in the equation above are the optimal ones described in (IC).
Replacing the equation above in the objective function of the buyer-i, which is Ti =
bi + aiE[Ci], and
Ti = −
∑
j 6=i
bncj −
[
− (1− ai)E[Ci]− e
2
i
2α
− r(1− ai)
2σ2
2
]
−
∑
j 6=i
[
− (1− ancj )E[Cj]−
e2j
2α
− r(1− a
nc
j )
2σ2
2
]
+ aiE[Ci].
Buyer-i chooses ai that minimizes the Ti described above. The first-order condition for
the problem the buyer-i problem is
α(1 +
κ2
n− 1) = (1− ai)[rσ
2 + α(1 + κ2) (30)
This equation gives the optimal choice of buyer-i given the other buyer (bnc−i, a
nc
−i), which is
equal to
anci = 1−
α
(
1 + κ
2
n−1
)
α(1 + κ2) + rσ2
,
Replacing the optimal anci described above in (29), we obtain the
bnci = (1− anci )β −
α(1 + κ)2(1− anc)2
2
+
rσ2(1− anc)2
2
,
which is the one characterized in (19). 
Proof of Proposition 3 Part 1 : From equations (13) and (18), then
(1− aci(κ))− (1− anci (κ)) =
α(1 + κ)2
αn[ 2κ
n−1 +
κ2(n−2)
(n−1)2 ] + [α(1− κn−1)2 + rσ2]
−
α
(
1 + κ
2
n−1
)
α(1 + κ2) + rσ2
.
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After some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
(1− aci(κ))− (1− anci (κ)) = 2κ(n− 1)rσ2 + rκ2σ2(n− 2)
+
κ2
(n− 1)2 (n
3 − 4n2 + 6n− 4)
. +
κ4
(n− 1)2 (2n
3 − 6n2 + 5n− 1) + 2κ3(n− 1).
which is equal or greater than zero for any n ≥ 2. In particular, when κ = 0, (1 − aci(κ)) −
(1− anci (κ)) is equal to zero.
Part 2 : From equation (18), we have that 1− anci =
α
(
1+ κ
2
n−1
)
α(1+κ2)+rσ2
. Deriving it with respect
to n, we have that
∂(1− aci(κ))
∂n
= − ακ
2
(n− 1)2(α(1 + κ2) + rσ2) ≤ 0
With strict inequality if n > 2, κ > 0 and α > 0.
Part 3 : In the equilibrium that the contractor will accept all contracts, Inc = N , there is
a unique ai, ∀i that solves the first-order conditions (30). Given that, the (19) is the unique
symmetric bi’s that are equilibrium.
Part 4 : In the exclusive dealing contract, a buyer and the contractor sign a contract in
which the contract commits to perform activities only for that buyer. In the exclusive dealing
contract, the optimal power of the contract is (1−aEDi ) = (1+rσ2)−1, and the buyer expected
transfer will be
E[TEDi ] = β −
(1− αED)(1 + αED)
2
+
rσ2
2
(1− aED)2 (31)
From (3), we know that buyer-i expected transfer is E[Ti(Ci)] = bi + aiE[Ci]. Replacing
the equilibrium values of bi and ai, characterized by (19) and (18) in that expected transfer
expression, and also in the production cost expression in (1), we obtain the equilibrium buyer-i
expected transfer which is
E[T nci ] = β −
(1 + κ)2
2
[ 1 + κ2
n−1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
][
2−
[ 1 + κ2
n−1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
]]
+
rσ2
2
[ 1 + κ2
n−1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
]2
(32)
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We want to show that E[T nci ]−E[TEDi ] < 0. Because, as will show in Corollary 4, that that
∂E[Tnci (n)]
∂n
≥ 0, ∀n ≥ 3. It means that E[T nci (3)] ≤ E[T nci (3)] ≤ ... ≤ E[T nci (n)]. Therefore, it is
sufficient to show that: (i) E[limn→∞ T nci (n)]−E[TEDi ] < 0, and (ii) E[T nci (2)]−E[TEDi ] < 0.
Let us prove that (i) E[limn→∞ T nci (n)]−E[TEDi ] < 0. After some algebraic manipulations,
we obtain
E[ lim
n→∞
T nci (n)] = β −
(1 + κ)2
2
( 2
1 + κ2 + rσ2
)(1 + 2κ2 + 2rσ2
1 + κ2 + rσ2
)
+ rσ2
( 1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
)2
Defining Φ(κ) = E[limn→∞ T nci (n)] − E[TEDi ], and after some algebraic manipulations, we
obtain
Φ(κ) = −1
2
{(1 + κ)2(1 + 2κ2 + 2rσ2)(1 + rσ2)− (1 + κ2 + rσ2)2
(1 + rσ2)(1 + κ2 + rσ2)2
}
Evaluation this expression at κ = 0, we obtain Φ(0) = 0. In addition, we obtain that Φ(1) is
equal to:
Φ(1) = − 1
2(1 + rσ2)(2 + rσ2)
{
8 + 12rσ2 + 3(rσ2)2
}
< 0
To conclude the proof, we need to show that Φ(κ) is monotonic decreasing in κ, that is to
show that ∂Φ(κ)
∂κ
> 0. Computing this derivative, we obtain
∂Φ(κ)
∂κ
= − [(1 + rσ
2)(1 + κ2 + rσ2)]
2[(1 + rσ2)(1 + κ2 + rσ2)2]2
+
[4κ(1 + rσ2)(1 + κ2 + rσ2)][(1 + κ)2(1 + 2κ2 + 2rσ2)(1 + rσ2)− (1 + κ2 + rσ2)2]
2[(1 + rσ2)(1 + κ2 + rσ2)2]2
.
which is negative for any κ ∈ [0, 1].
Now, let us prove that (ii) E[T nci (2)] − E[TEDi ] < 0. Before, note that E[T nci (2)] is
the equilibrium, which means that E[T nci (2)] = E[T
nc
i (2)(a
nc
i , a
nc
−i)]. Since a
nc
i is the op-
timal solution for buyer-i problem, then E[T nci (2)(a
nc
i , a
nc
−i)] < E[T
nc
i (2)(ai, a
nc
−i)],∀ai. In
particular, E[T nci (2)(a
nc
i , a
nc
−i)] < E[T
nc
i (2)(a
ED, anc−i)]. Therefore, it is enough to show that
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E[T nci (2)(a
ED, anc−i)]− E[TEDi ].
E[T nci (2)(a
ED, anc−i)] = β −
[(1− aED) + κ(1− anci )][1 + aED + κ(1− anci )]
2
− [(1− a
nc
i ) + κ(1− aED)][1 + κaED + κ− anci )]
2
+
rσ2
2
(1− aED)2 + +(1− κ)
2(1− anci )2
2
.
Computing E[T nci (2)(a
ED, anc−i)]− E[TEDi ], we get
E[T nci (2)(a
ED, anc−i)]− E[TEDi ] = −2κ(1− anci )(1 + anci )− κ2(1 + anci )(1− anci ) < 0.
Proof of Corollary 2 Deriving (1− anci ), which is implicity defined (18), with respect to κ,
we obtain
∂(1− anci )
∂κ
= −2ακ
[
α
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
− rσ
2
n− 1
]
(33)
Expression (33) is positive if n ≥ 2+ rσ2
α
. This result says that, when the number of buyers
contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently high, the higher is the externality effect,
the lower is the lower power is the externality effects. This result is quite intuitive. When
the number of buyers contracting with the same contractor is sufficiently high, the free-riding
effect off set the fact that a higher κ increases the marginal benefit of eliciting contractor’s
effort (due to cost reduction), leading to lower power procurement contracts.
Proof of Corollary 3 From (18), we know that (1 − anci ) =
α
(
1+ κ
2
n−1
)
α(1+κ2)+rσ2
. From (13), we
know that when κ = 0, (1 − aci(0)) = 1 − αα+rσ2 . In particular, note that if κ = 0, then
(1− aci(0)) = (1− anci (0)). Therefore,
(1− anci (κ))− (1− aci(0)) = −1 +
1
n− 1 +
rσ2
n− 1 .
It is positive if n ≥ n = 2 + rσ2. 
Proof of Corollary 4 From (3), we know that buyer-i expected transfer is E[Ti(Ci)] =
bi + aiE[Ci]. Replacing the equilibrium values of bi and ai, characterized by (19) and (18) in
that expected transfer expression, and also in the production cost expression in (1), we obtain
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the equilibrium buyer-i expected transfer which is
E[T nci (n, κ, σ)] = β−
(1 + κ)2
2
[ 1 + κ2
n−1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
][
2−
[ 1 + κ2
n−1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
]]
+
rσ2
2
[ 1 + κ2
n−1
1 + κ2 + rσ2
]2
(34)
The partial derivative of E[T nci (n, κ, σ)] with respect to n is equal to:
∂E[T nci (n, κ, σ)]
∂n
=
−1
2(n− 1)2(1 + κ2 + rσ2)2
[
− 2rκ2(1 + κ)2σ2 + 2rκ2σ2
(
1 +
κ2
n− 1
)]
After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the following expression for the derivative above:
∂E[T nci (n, κ, σ)]
∂n
=
2rκ3σ2
2(n− 1)3(1 + κ2 + rσ2)2
[
κ(n− 3) + 2(n− 1)
]
,
with is positive whenever κ ≥ κ = −2(n−1)
n−3 . Note that κ =
−2(n−1)
n−3 is negative for any n ≥ 3.
Since that we have assumed κ ≥ 0, then we can conclude that if n ≥ 3, then ∂E[Tnci (n,κ,σ)]
∂n
≥ 0.

Proof of Propostion 4 In the text.
Proof of Proposition 5 . First, we compute the expected payoff of each buyer (v−E[T FPi ])
when they commit to fixed-price contracts, ai = 0,∀i. Then, we compute the expected payoff
of each buyer in the noncooperative contracting equilibrium (v − E[T nci ]). To conclude, we
provide the conditions that guarantees that (v − E[T FPi ]) > (v − E[T nci ]).
Part 1 If ai = 0,∀i, then according to (IC), e = ei = (1 + κ),∀i. Then, in the symmetric
equilibrium, the contractor will accept all the contracts I = N if and only if bi = β − e(1 +
κ) + rσ
2
2
+ e
2
2
,∀i. Given that the buyer-i expected transfer is E[Ti(Ci)] = bi + aiE[Ci], and
the production cost expression in (1), we obtain the buyer-i expected transfer when all buyer
relies on fixed-price contracts.
E[T FPi (n, κ, σ)] = β +
rσ2
2
− (1 + κ)
2
2
.
Part 2 In the noncooperative contracting equilibrium, the buyer-i expected transfer is
E[T FPi (n, κ, σ)] = β +
r(1− ainc)2σ2
2
− (1− a
nc
i )
2(1 + κ)2
2
.
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where ainc are defined in (refnoncoopa).
Part 3 To conclude, we provide the conditions that guarantees that (v − E[T FPi ]) >
(v−E[T nci ]). For that, we need to show under which conditions E[T FPi ] ≤ E[T nci ]. After some
algebraic manipulations, we obtain that
E[T FPi ]− E[T nci ] = −
anci
2
(rσ2(anci − 2) + (1 + κ)2anci )
Therefore, to that the expression above is negative, it is sufficient to show that
(anci − 2) + (1 + κ)2anci ≥ 0. (35)
Replacing anci , defined in (18), in (35), we obtain that the left-hand side of the expression
(35) is equal to
ψ(n) =
−rnσ2κ2 − (n− 1)r2(σ2)2 − 2nrσ2 + 2rσ2
(n− 1)(1 + κ2 + rσ2) +
−2(1 + κ)2κ2 + rn(1 + κ)2σ2 − rσ2(1 + κ)2
(n− 1)(1 + κ2 + rσ2) .
Note that ψ(2) = − rσ2(rσ2+(1−κ)2
(n−1)(1+κ2+rσ2) , which is negative. In addition, limn→∞ ψ(n) = ∞. Since
that ψ(n) is a continuous function, then the only conditions that we have to provide are the
ones that guarantee that ∂ψ(n)
∂n
monotonic positive. Doing so, we can guarantee that ∃n such
that ∀n ≥ n ψ(n), and consequently (35).
Deriving ψ(n) with respect to n, we obtain
∂ψ(n)
∂n
= −r2σ4 − rσ2(1− 2κ) + κ2(1 + κ)2.
Note that it is a quadratic equation in (rσ2). Solving that quadratic equation for (rσ2), we
found that ∂ψ(n)
∂n
is strictly positive if
rσ2 ≤ rσ2 = (1− 2κ)
2 + 2κ2(1 + κ)2
2
+
(1− 2κ)
2
√
(1 + 2κ2)2 − 4κ(1 + κ)(1− 2κ).
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Proof of Proposition 6 First we will derive the power of the procurement contracts in the
procurement auction design game (1−apai ), then we will compare it with the the power of the
noncooperative equilibrium contracts (1− anci ).
Part 1 - The power of the procurement contracts Without loss of generality, consider
the case that n = 2. In the procurement auction design game, each buyer-i chooses ai
which minimizes his expected transfer, Ti = bi + aiE[Ci], taking into account the contractor’s
bid. The equilibrium bidding strategies are described in (27) and (26). Replacing them in
Ti = bi + aiE[Ci], and given the (IC) constraint, we find that
Ti = β − 1
2
[(1− ai) + κ(1− aj)][(1 + ai) + κ(1 + aj)]− 1
2
[(1− aj) + κ(1− ai)][(1 + aj) + κ(1 + ai)] +
rσ2(1− ai)2
2
+ (1− aj) + κ(1− ai) + κ[(1− ai) + κ(1− aj)][(1 + ai) + κ(1 + aj)] +
− [(1− aj) + κ(1− ai)]
2
2
.
Buyer-i chooses ai that maximizes the Ti described above. The first-order condition for
the problem the buyer-i problem is
κ2 + 1 = (1− rσ2)(1− aj) + κ(1− ai), ∀i, j (36)
Since that n = 2, to find the equilibrium a1 and a2 we have to solve the following system of
equations
κ2 + 1 = (1− rσ2)(1− a2) + κ(1− a2)
κ2 + 1 = (1− rσ2)(1− a1) + κ(1− a2).
The solution for the system of equation is:
1− apai =
1 + κ2
1 + rσ2 + κ
,∀i
which is the power equilibrium of the power of the procurement contracts in the procurement
design game.
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Part 2 - Comparing the power of the procurement contracts in the procurement auction
design game (1 − apai ) with the power of the noncooperative equilibrium contracts (1 − anci ).
For the case that n = 2, then
1− anci =
1 + κ2
1 + rσ2 + κ2
,∀i
Making some algebraic manipulations, we can show that (1−apai ) < (1−anci ) if and if κ2 < κ,
which happens if and only if κ ∈ (0, 1). 
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